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Abstract
In quasi-proportional auctions, the allocation is shared among bid-
ders in proportion to their weighted bids. The auctioneer selects a bid
weight function, and bidders know the weight function when they bid.
In this note, we analyze how weight functions that are exponential in
the bid affect bidder behavior. We show that exponential weight func-
tions have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, we characterize bids at
an equilibrium, and we compare it to an equilibrium for power weight
functions.
1 Introduction
Quasi-proportional auctions [2, 9] award each bidder a share of the allocation
proportional to their weighted bid. Specifically, if b is the vector of bids, bi
is bidder i’s bid, and f is the weight function, then bidder i has allocation:
ai(b) =
f(bi)∑
j f(bj)
. (1)
We focus on winners-pay, so each bidder pays their bid times their allocation.
Let vi be bidder i’s private value for a full allocation and assume linear
valuation. Then bidder i has utility (profit):
ui(b) = (vi − bi)ai(b). (2)
1
ar
X
iv
:1
50
9.
01
31
4v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  4
 Se
p 2
01
5
For power weight functions of the form f(x) = xp with p > 0, Wen et
al. [15] show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists and supply lower
bounds for bids at an equilibrium. For exponential weight functions of the
form f(x) = ecx − 1, we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists,
characterize bids at an equilibrium, and give lower bounds for those bids.
In addition, we compare exponential and power weight functions, showing
that the revenue-maximizing exponential weight function produces more rev-
enue than the revenue-maximizing power weight function for even moderately
competitive auctions.
A second-price winner-take-all auction with reserve prices is known to be
revenue-optimal [12, 14]. So why explore revenue maximization for quasi-
proportional auctions? First, the requirements for setting optimal reserve
prices are not always met in practice. Second, the quasi-proportional auction
has some properties that make it preferable in some settings.
The second-price winner-take-all auction with reserve prices maximizes
expected revenue given prior distributions for bidders’ private values. There
can be problems if the auctioneer’s priors for bidders’ private values are
unknown, innaccurate, or very precise. Unknown priors leave the auctioneer
in the prior-free setting [6, 7]. In some cases, priors may be learned from
bids in successive auctions [10, 3, 4, 8], in others, private values or their
distributions may change too much from auction to auction for learning to be
very effective. Inaccurate priors produce reserve prices that are not optimal.
This can significantly reduce revenue, because expected revenue can be very
sensitive to reserve prices [11].
Quasi-proportional auctions have the following properties that can be
advantages over the second-price winner-take-all auction with reserve prices:
1. Full Allocation. Quasi-proportional auctions always result in sales,
assuming at least one bidder with a nonzero bid. With reserve prices,
there is no sale unless some bidder bids at least their reserve price.
2. Shared Allocation. Quasi-proportional auctions award some alloca-
tion to each bidder who enters a positive bid. This “second prize for
second price” [15] can give bidders an incentive to bid even if they know
they are unlikely to be the highest bidders.
3. Smooth Response to Bid Changes. In a quasi-proportional auc-
tion, each bidder’s allocation and payment varies continuously in their
bid, increasing for any bid increase and decreasing for any bid decrease.
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With winner-take-all, a slight increase or decrease in bid either has no
effect or completely alters the allocation and payment.
4. Symmetric Outcomes for Bidders. In a quasi-proportional auc-
tion, if two bidders swap bids, then they swap allocations and pay-
ments. With reserve prices, this may not hold, because bidders with
different priors will, in general, have different reserve prices.
2 Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria
In this section, we show that for f(x) = ecx − 1 there is a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium, we characterize bids at an equilibrium, and we give lower
bounds for bids at an equilibrium. To simplify notation, when we focus on
a single bidder, we drop the bidder’s subscript (for example using b for the
bid instead of bi), we drop the arguments in parentheses for functions, and
we use apostrophes to denote derivatives with respect to b. For example, f ′′
is the second derivative of the weight function with respect to bid.
Focus on a single bidder. Their response curve is their utility as a function
of their bid, given other bidders’ bids. Their best response is the bid that
maximizes their utility given other bidders’ bids.
Theorem 2.1 With weight function f(x) = ecx − 1, for any b with at least
two positive bids, each bidder’s response curve has a single extremum over
[0, v], and it is a maximum.
Proof We require at least two positive bids to ensure that no bidder’s re-
sponse curve has a zero denominator for the allocation. (With a single pos-
itive bid, that bidder’s response curve would have a zero denominator at
zero.) Note that utility is zero at bids 0 and v, positive in between, bounded,
and continuous. So it has a maximum in (0, v).
Lemma 5 in the proof of Theorem 1 in [15] states that if ff ′′ < 2(f ′)2
then (u′ = 0) =⇒ (u′′ < 0). For us, f = ecx − 1, f ′ = cecx, and f ′′ = c2ecx.
Substitute and simplify:
ff ′′ < 2(f ′)2. (3)
(ecx − 1) c2ecx < 2c2e2cx. (4)
ecx − 1 < 2ecx. (5)
− 1 < ecx. (6)
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So (u′ = 0) =⇒ (u′′ < 0), meaning that every extremum is a local maximum,
so there are no local minima in (0, v). If there were multiple local maxima,
then each successive pair would have a local minimum in between. So the
lack of interior local minima implies at most one maximum.
Let BRi(b) be bidder i’s best response to bids b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn
from b, and let BR be the vector of best responses (BR1(b), . . . ,BRn(b)). At
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium bids b∗, BR(b∗) = b∗. Now we characterize
bids at a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. (Later we prove one exists.)
Theorem 2.2 At any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium b∗ with at least two
positive bids,
∀i : b∗i = vi −
1
c
(
1− 1
ecb
∗
i
)(
1
1− ai(b∗)
)
. (7)
Proof Focus on a single bidder. Since
u = (v − b)a,
u′ = −a+ (v − b)a′.
Since
a =
f
f + s
,
where s =
∑
j 6=i f(bj) is the sum of other bidders’ weighted bids,
a′ =
f ′
f + s
− ff
′
(f + s)2
=
f ′
f + s
(1− a).
So
u′ = −a+ (v − b)(1− a) f
′
f + s
.
Set u′ = 0 and solve for b to find the best response.
b = v − a
1− a
(f + s)
f ′
.
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Since a = f
f+s
,
b = v − f
f ′
(
1
1− a
)
.
Since f = ecb − 1 and f ′ = cecb,
b = v − 1
c
(
1− 1
ecb
)(
1
1− a
)
.
This characterization is not a closed-form solution, because ecb
∗
i depends
on b∗i and ai depends on b
∗. However, it will give some insight about equilib-
rium, and we will extend this theorem to get bounds for bids at equilibrium
and prove that one exists.
For some insight on equilibrium for exponential weight functions, we will
compare to an equilibrium characterization for power weight functions. Sub-
stitute f = bp and f ′ = pbp−1 into Equality 2.
b = v − b
p
(
1
1− a
)
.
Solve for b:
b =
v
1 + 1
p
(
1
1−a
) .
So for any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium b∗ with at least two positive bids,
∀i : b∗i =
vi
1 + 1
p
(
1
1−ai(b∗)
) .
Compare this to Theorem 2.2. At a high level, equilibrium bids for ex-
ponential weight functions subtract an amount from the private value, but
equilibrium bids for power weight functions divide the private value by one
plus an amount. The amounts have similar forms. They share the term 1
1−a ,
which decreases equilibrium bids as the bidder’s share of the equilibrium al-
location increases. The terms 1
c
and 1
p
increase equilibrium bids as steeper
weight functions are selected. For both exponential and power weight func-
tions, the steepness parameter (c or p) mediates a tradeoff: a steeper weight
function increases bids via 1
c
or 1
p
but decreases the highest bidder’s equi-
librium bid by increasing their share of the allocation, which increases 1
1−a .
Balancing these effects maximizes revenue. For both exponential and power
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weight functions, increasing competition – by having closer private values
among top bidders, by having more bidders, or both – allows the auctioneer
to increase the steepness parameter without allowing the bidder with the
highest private value to submit a low bid relative to their private value and
still capture the lion’s share of the allocation. As a result, increasing compe-
tition increases the steepness of the revenue-maximizing weight function and
increases the equilibrium revenue for that weight function.
The next theorem characterizes lower boundsw for bids at an equilibrium.
Theorem 2.3 For f(x) = ecx − 1, if w satisfies:
∀i : wi ≤ vi − 1
c
(
1− 1
ecwi
)(
1
1− ai(w)
)
, (8)
where ai(w) is the allocation to bidder i if b = w, then (∀i : bi ≥ wi) =⇒
(∀i : BRi(b) ≥ wi).
Proof Focus on a single bidder i. Assume ∀j 6= i : bj ≥ wj. Let u be
bidder i’s utility function given other bidders’ bids, and let b be bidder i’s
response bid. By Theorem 2.1, u has a single local maximum, u′ < 0 before
the maximum, and u′ > 0 after the maximum. So if u′ ≥ 0 at b = w, then
the best response is w or greater.
From the proof of Theorem 2.2, solve for u′ ≥ 0 at b = w rather than
u′ = 0 at b:
w ≤ v − 1
c
(
1− 1
ecw
)(
1
1− a(w,b)
)
, (9)
where a(w,b) is the allocation to bidder i if bidder i bids w and the other
bidders maintain their bids from vector b. Let a(w) be the allocation to
bidder i if b = w. Since we assume ∀j 6= i : bj ≥ wj, ai(w) ≥ a(w,b).
(Decreasing competitors’ bids increases bidder i’s allocation.) So
v − 1
c
(
1− 1
ecw
)(
1
1− a(w)
)
≤ v − 1
c
(
1− 1
ecw
)(
1
1− a(w,b)
)
, (10)
and
w ≤ v − 1
c
(
1− 1
ecw
)(
1
1− a(w)
)
. (11)
Now we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
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Theorem 2.4 Suppose w satisfies:
∀i : wi ≤ vi − 1
c
(
1− 1
ecwi
)(
1
1− ai(w)
)
.
Then
∃b∗ ∈ [w1, v1]× . . .× [wn, vn] : BR(b∗) = b∗.
Proof According to Brouwer’s fixed point theorem [1, 5], a function has a
fixed point in a convex compact set if the function is continuous and maps
the set into itself. Theorem 2.3 shows that the function BR maps [w1, v1]×
. . .× [wn, vn] into itself.
Having shown that there is an equilibrium, we can use Theorem 2.3 to
derive bounds for bids at that equilibrium. For example,
Corollary 2.5 Without loss of generality, let v1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn. Let
w1 = v2 − 2
c
,
and
∀i ≥ 2 : wi = vi − 2
c
.
Then (∀i : bi ≥ wi) =⇒ (∀i : BRi(b) ≥ wi).
Proof We will show that the w in the corollary meets the conditions of
Theorem 2.3. For w1, since w1 = w2, a1(w) = a2(w), so a1(w) ≤ 12 . So
w1 = v2 − 2
c
≤ v1 − 1
c
(
1
1− a1(w)
)
≤ v1 − 1
c
(
1− 1
ecw1
)(
1
1− a1(w)
)
.
For i ≥ 2, wi ≤ wi−1, so ai(w) ≤ 12 . Hence
wi = vi − 2
c
≤ vi − 1
c
(
1
1− ai(w)
)
≤ v1 − 1
c
(
1− 1
ecwi
)(
1
1− ai(w)
)
.
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3 Tests
This section presents test results showing that exponential weight functions
produce more revenue than power weight functions when there is even a
modest level of competition among bidders. The tests include a two-bidder
scenario (n = 2) and a ten-bidder scenario (n = 10.) For the ten-bidder
scenario, there is a single bidder with a higher private valuation, and the
others have equal private valuations. This scenario is called OLOS (one
large and others the same) in [15].
For each scenario, we set v1 ≥ v2 = . . . = vn, and define α = v1v2 . For each
α ∈ {1.2, 1.4, . . . , 10.0} ∪ {20, 30, . . . , 100}, we ran tests for a range of c and
p values to determine which values of these steepness parameters maximized
auction revenue for exponential and power weight functions, respectively. In
each test, we set v1 = α and v2 = . . . = vn = 1, initialized all bids to
1
2
, then
for 100 iterations used the best response for each bidder to the other bidders’
previous bids as the bidder’s next bid. In other words, we set b0 = (1
2
, . . . , 1
2
),
then repeated bi+1 = BR(bi) one hundred times to get final bids b100. We
used the final bids to determine revenue for the scenario and c or p value.
Figure 1 displays the maximum revenue and revenue-maximizing c and
p values for the two-bidder scenario. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show that the
best exponential weight function produces more revenue than the best power
weight function for α < 70. In other words, with two bidders, the best expo-
nential weight function generates more auction revenue than the best power
weight function unless one bidder’s private value is at least 70 times the
other’s. Figures 1(c) and 1(d) show that very steep weight functions maxi-
mize revenue when bidders’ private values are nearly equal, but the revenue-
maximizing parameter values decrease as competition decreases. In other
words, when there is stiff competition, the auctioneer can run something
close to a winner-take-all auction using a steep weight function, but when
there is weak competition, the auctioneer must use a flatter weight function
to threaten the high-value bidder with having to share the allocation with the
low-value bidder. For strong or moderate competition, exponential weight
functions provide something closer to a winner-take-all auction because of
their steeper shape, while flatter power weight functions provide a stronger
threat to share the allocation almost equally among bidders when there is
very weak competition.
Figure 2 shows the allocation to the high-value bidder and the bids for
the revenue-maximizing c and p values with n = 2. Exponential and power
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weight functions award similar allocations for strong competition (low α),
but exponential weight functions allocate more to the high bidder as compe-
tition decreases. This is consistent with power weight functions threatening,
and partially achieving, more sharing under weak competition. Exponential
weight functions result in the high and low bidder having closer bids under
strong competition, but this reverses as competition weakens, with equally
close bids at about α = 50. Steeper weight functions force the bidder with
lower private value to bid higher in order to get more than a very small
portion of the allocation; this, in turn, can drive the bidder with higher pri-
vate value to bid higher. As weight functions get less steep (with increasing
α), the lower bids actually decrease, because the lower bidder can obtain a
sizable portion of the allocation even with a low bid.
Figure 3 shows revenue and optimal steepness results for the n = 10
scenario, which has more competition than the n = 2 scenario, in the form
of more bidders. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show that, under this increased
competition, the difference between exponential and power weight function
revenue increases, and exponential weight functions continue to produce more
revenue than power weight functions even for α = 100. (The crossover is
between 100 and 200 – not shown on these figures.) Figures 3(c) and 3(d)
show that optimal weight functions are flatter as competition decreases (as
α increases).
Figure 4 shows allocations and bids for revenue-maximizing weight func-
tions with n = 10. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show that the allocation to the
highest bidder decreases gradually as α increases for power weight functions.
For exponential weight functions, the allocation is close to the allocation for
power weight functions until α > 10. Then the allocation for power weight
functions decreases as α increases. In contrast, for exponential weight func-
tions, the allocation increases, giving more allocation to the highest bidder
as competition weakens. Figures 4(c) and 4(d) show that, as for n = 2,
exponential weight functions produce more of a spread between bids under
more competition, and this reverses for α > 70.
4 Discussion
For exponential weight functions, we have characterized bids at a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium. We have also shown that exponential weight
functions can provide more revenue than power weight functions, for a two-
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bidder auction and a ten-bidder auction with a single high private value
bidder and nine equal private value bidders, if there is strong or even mod-
erate competition. So exponential weight functions should be considered for
quasi-proportional auctions.
For both exponential and power weight functions, increasing competition
by having a ratio of bidder private values closer to one increases the steep-
ness of the revenue-maximizing weight function. The relationship between
this steepness and increasing competition by having more bidders is more
complex. Analyzing and understanding this relationship warrants further
study. Wen et al. [15] show that, for power weight functions, as the num-
ber of bidders increases from two, the optimal steepness initially decreases,
then increases. As α increases, the initial decrease becomes less pronounced.
Comparing Figures 1(c) and 3(c) in this paper, for power weight functions,
the optimal steepness for ten bidders is actually less than for two bidders
until α = 10. Then, comparing Figures 1(d) and 3(d), there is a crossover
before α = 20. For exponential weight functions, this effect is even more pro-
nounced: the optimal steepness for ten bidders is less than for two bidders
for α = 1.2 to α = 100 and beyond (based on the same pairs of figures and
on computations to α = 1000, not shown in the figures). Understanding this
phenomenon may give insight on how to develop new weight functions and
how to select a weight function.
One direction for future research is to develop effective methods to choose
the steepness parameter, given limited information about bidders’ private
values. Another direction is to investigate more complex weight functions,
for example weight functions that are relatively steep for low bids and less
steep for high bids. For a related idea, refer to [13], for a quasi-proportional
auction that determines allocations based on the ratio between bids. Another
direction for future research is to investigate analogs to reserve prices for
quasi-proportional allocations, for example have the auctioneer submit a bid
and withhold the allocation for that bid from the allocation to bidders. This
method decreases risk to the seller compared to using a reserve price, because
this method makes zero revenue less likely.
One more direction for future research is to explore revenue maximization
over a more general set of weight functions that includes both powers and
exponentials. Since ex = 1 + x+ x
2
2!
+ x
3
3!
+ . . .:
ecx − 1 = cx+ c
2
2!
x2 +
c3
3!
x3 + . . .
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So our exponential weight functions belong to the general set of polynomial
weight functions (without constant terms, so f(0) = 0), if we allow infinite
degree:
fc(x) =
∞∑
i=1
cix
i,
where c = (c1, c2, . . .) is the vector of coefficients. Of course, power weight
functions also belong to this set, as polynomials with a single coefficient of
one in c and the other coefficients zero. It would be interesting to understand
how the coefficients of the revenue-optimizing weight function of the form fc
depend on the relationships between private values and on the number of
bidders.
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Figure 2: Allocation to High Bidder and Bids at Maximum Revenue for
n = 2.
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